Abstract
Introduction
What we are inheriting is not just inequality, but a system of structured inequality, and one brought about by deliberate state policy. Removing the barriers to equal participation … is a national task requiring active steps by all of us.
-Albie Sachs 2 Authoritarian regimes and violent conflict are typically associated with political disenfranchisement, social discrimination and economic deprivation, largely engineered by law. 3 The resulting structural disadvantage leads to effective disempowerment, thereby making it extremely difficult for the affected population to open the door to change.
Socioeconomic disadvantage tends to be reproduced, if not accumulated, over generations.
The current primary focus of transitional justice on physical integrity rights and its neglect of economic, social and cultural rights underestimates the entrenched socioeconomic deprivation of victims manufactured by previous regimes. 4 While transitional justice scholars increasingly argue in favour of economic, social and cultural rights being taken into account, 5 the terrain of transitional justice is still contested in this respect. In the period 2000-2002, babies of Indigenous mothers continued to be twice as likely to be of low birth weight as babies born to non-Indigenous mothers (13% compared to 6%). 13 In this context, a rethinking of transitional justice is required that will enable the field to take enduring legacies of injustice into account. As law was utilized to preserve privileges, thereby generating systemic deprivation leading to disempowerment, law not only needs to change formally but also to contribute to transformation in substance. At the core of this change is the imperative of participation. A focus on the empowerment of victims affected by law's pathology is needed. Two reparative trajectories have to be put in motion at the same time: law has to be rehabilitated (the first trajectory) by initiating and creating the conditions for the rehabilitation of victims (the second trajectory), namely victims affected by economic, social and political structural disempowerment. The measure of such enabling transitional justice is the degree and scope of enabled participation, including a response to violations of socioeconomic rights. This article suggests that an enabling transitional justice framework is best achieved by starting with a conceptualization of human rights based on the capability approach advanced by Amartya Sen 14 and expanded by Martha Nussbaum. 15 This article proceeds as follows. First, the capability approach as a basis for human rights is explored. The capability approach to human rights reveals the structural transformation necessary for the realization of human rights. Second, the article develops the concept of capability rights as rights to participatory capabilities. The 'agent-rooted' dimension of participatory capabilities has one goal, namely the repair and expansion of capabilities necessary to function as equal citizens. Third, the implications of these concepts for the current paradigm of transitional justice are examined. 'De-clustering' of multiple If someone claims that there is a fundamental right to X, it is incumbent on them to justify it; and justification will proceed by showing how the right to X is required to serve some capability. If there is no capability that it serves, then it is not a fundamental right.
Human Rights as Capability Rights

29
Nussbaum has introduced her own approach to human rights and capabilities. She agrees with Sen as far as the complementarity of the two concepts is concerned. 30 Referring to the right to political participation, the right to the free exercise of religion and the right to free speech, she emphasizes that 'these and others [rights] These aspects encompass the following elements:
To be capable of functioning as a human being requires effective access to the means of sustaining one's biological existence -food, shelter, clothing, medical care -and access to the basic conditions of human agency -knowledge of one's circumstances and options, the ability to deliberate about means and ends, the psychological conditions of autonomy, including the self-confidence to think and judge for oneself, freedom of thought and movement. Amartya Sen, 'Democracy as Universal Value', Journal of Democracy, 10(3) (1999):10. While Sen addresses primarily the value of democracy, it is evident that, for him, democracy and participation in public reasoning are inextricably intertwined. 44 Ibid.; Sen, 1999, supra n 14 at 148; Drydyk, supra n 42. 45 Anderson, supra n 40 at 317. 46 Ibid., 317. 47 Ibid., 317.
To be capable of functioning as an equal participant in a system of cooperative production requires effective access to the means of production, access to the education needed to develop one's talents, freedom of occupational choice, the right to make contracts and enter into cooperative agreements with others, the right to receive fair value for one's labor, and recognition by others of one's productive contributions.
To be capable of functioning as a citizen requires rights to political participation, such as freedom of speech and the franchise, and also effective access to the goods and relationships of civil society. ( … ) This also entails the social conditions of being accepted by others, such as the ability to appear in public without shame, and not being ascribed outcast status. ' Ibid., 150 . In a transitional context, however, this criterion may be said to correspond to the analogous demand for victims of pretransitional injustice to be able to establish the content of injustice. 59 Ibid., 140-141. It is noteworthy that equal opportunities to participate have a particular relevance in transitional contexts as previously marginalized citizens 'will be able to raise redistributive claims in the political sphere as they see fit. ' For the notion of participatory capabilities, see, ibid.
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As Bohman remarks, 'human diversity flourishes in a well-functioning democracy with a vibrant public sphere accessible to all citizens.' Bohman, supra n 48 at 346. Yet, as Olson argues, promoting the equality of participatory capabilities may 'require levelling structures that amplify the voices of some and diminish the voices of others.' Olson, supra n 53 at 145. ____________________________________________________Enabling Transitional Justice | 15
The reluctance of the current transitional justice paradigm to pay attention to the socioeconomic dimension risks undermining the democratic project inherent in transition. The lack of participation in civil society is in this way not merely a matter of distributive justice, but of the freedom from domination that comes with the condition or status of membership.
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As for the current transitional justice paradigm, victims of historical injustice are not only invisible as structures of exclusion and domination experienced in the past persist, they remain 'invisible as a consequence of the structural features of markets' 72 to the extent that markets fail to bring about redress by trickle-down benefits. What is the remedy?
Participatory Capabilities and the Democratic Minimum
This article advances the capability perspective to reframe transitional justice in such a way that it is able to respond to the structured features of pretransitional socioeconomic rights violations. Bohman's account lends support to this view. As he asserts, Instead of integrity, respect, or esteem, structural exclusion requires a capabilitiesbased approach to freedom in order to provide its diagnosis and remedy. In the same way that capabilities cannot be addressed as a matter of the distribution of resources, structural exclusion cannot be directly addressed in the categories of recognition; domination is a matter of freedom, and capabilities are a matter of realizing substantive freedoms and functionings. Klasen Stephan, 'Social Exclusion, Children and Education. Implications of a Rights-Based Approach,' European Societies 3(4) (2001): 413. Social exclusion is particularly precarious for children. As Klasen argues, 'childhood social exclusion ... has larger negative social effects … People who have suffered from childhood social exclusion in education are at risk of being poor and unemployed for longer and more often than others. Apart from the exclusionary effects of these problems, they are associated with lower health outcomes, decreased access to housing and to food, and poorer access to healthcare.' Ibid., 437. You do not take a person who for years has been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him up to the starting point of a race, and then say, 'You are free to compete with all the others,' and still justly believe you have been completely fair. (…) We seek not just freedom, but opportunity -not just legal equity but human ability -not just equality as a right and a theory but equality as a fact and as a result.
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What is critical to remedying systemic historical exclusion, according to Bohman, is the 'achievement of a normative status sufficient for citizens to exercise their normative and creative powers to reshape democracy according to the demands of justice.'
75 Bohman calls this normative status the 'democratic minimum,' which requires 'achieving a fundamental threshold of freedoms and the powers that they entail.' 76 Importantly, Bohman cautions,
The purpose of the conception of the democratic minimum is thus not to describe the ideal conditions of full parity; rather it is to describe the necessary but not sufficient conditions for democratic arrangements to be a means to realize justice under nonideal conditions.
77
As he asserts, 'the obvious place to begin developing the democratic minimum is in terms of the republican account of those human rights that contribute to having the status of ____________________________________________________Enabling Transitional Justice | 17 alia, dependent on the rights to socioeconomic capabilities such as the ability to find work, to become educated and to lead a healthy life of normal length. 81 Therefore, transitional justice has to respond to the corresponding capability deprivation in pretransitional contexts. As
Bohman succinctly argues, 'the forms of extreme destitution, historical injustice, and social exclusion … create conditions of capability failure that are functionally equivalent to tyranny and the absence of political rights.'
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As legal systems prevailing in the past generally played a negative role by contributing to capability deprivation, any transitional justice response has to start with the law. The goal of transitional justice must be the restoration and, hence, the instantiation of substantial freedom in terms of capabilities to social, economic and political participation.
Consequently, freedom will be, in the words of Bohman, 'a freedom through mutual accountability mediated through norms.'
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Given the inherent nexus between the political and the economic sphere, between participation and material inequality, 84 the rights to socioeconomic capabilities such as those related to work, health and education, for instance, may in fact be considered rights to participatory capabilities. 85 Claims for redress of socioeconomic capability rights violations represent simultaneously claims to redress in their own right as well as claims to the equalization of socioeconomic capabilities in order to enable effective participation. As a result, transitional law needs to be concerned not only with levelling the playing field in the future but also laying the groundwork for levelling the playing field at the transition point. This requirement is justified as the emerging, reconfigured polity derives its democratic legitimacy from the instantiation of equal opportunities for victims of pretransitional injustice, enabling them to participate not only in 81 As Nussbaum contends, 'it is very difficult to participate in political life on a basis of equality with others, or to enjoy the freedom of speech, if one has not had access to basic health care, or the opportunity for a decent education.' Martha C. Nussbaum, 'Constitutions and Capabilities: "Perception" against Lofty Formalism,' Harvard Law Review 121(4) (2007): 23. 82 Bohman, supra n 71 at 274. For historical examples, see the transitions in South Africa, Guatemala or East Timor. Significantly, the prevailing legal systems at the time generally played a negative role in these cases by contributing to capability deprivation. 83 Bohman, supra n 71 at 269. 84 Olson, supra n 53. 85 Compare Olson, who states, 'Agency should be seen as a matter of capabilities evaluated from political, cultural, and economic perspectives. ' Ibid., 207. transitional justice mechanisms but also in the formulation of 'norms, laws, and policies under which they live.' 86 It is in these two ways -formal legal change, on the one hand, and substantive and sustainable rehabilitation of victims' capabilities, on the other 87 -that law is mandated to operate a normative shift in transition.
Rethinking Transitional Justice
Legitimacy through Transitional Justice
The basic axis of the architecture of transitional justice is the normative shift to legitimate law The notion of 'sustainable' rehabilitation refers to the necessary structural change without which even rehabilitated victims would remain vulnerable to further or renewed violations of their socioeconomic rights. In other words, structural change is considered the conditio sine qua non to address root causes of human rights violations and prevent their recurrence.
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Ruti Teitel calls the normative shift 'transitions' defining feature.' Teitel, supra n 51 at 215. Moreover, the normative shift can be conceived as possibly spread out in multiple enactments of a diverse nature. As Teitel notes, 'Transitional operative acts include pronouncements of indictments and verdicts; the issuing of amnesties, reparations, and apologies; and the promulgation of constitutions and reports...' Ibid., 220. Ibid., 280.
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A cautionary note might be needed here, however. As Mutua asserts regarding Africa, 'to be of utility to Africa, and fundamentally transform the continent's dire fortunes, human rights must address economic powerlessness and the scandalous international order.' Mutua, supra n 4 at 37. normative shift, albeit with multiple enactments. 92 The normative shift becomes the locus of justice aptly captured by Emmanuel Levinas:
The Ibid., 121.
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Wolff and De-Shalit cite research from the US which highlights that 'parents who worked at night were 2.7 times as likely to have a child who had been suspended from school than parents who did not have to work nights.' Ibid., 209, n. 1. 105 Ibid., 122. formal change of law alone remains meaningless if it is unable to instantiate the restoration of socioeconomic capabilities, the foundation for the exercise of equal citizenship. Critical in this context is the interdependent nature of political equality, which will be examined next.
Capabilities and Political Equality
The capability perspective undercuts mainstream transitional justice, which appears to assume the insulation of political equality from other domains of the societal structure. Ibid., 322. In addition, O'Donnell emphasizes 'that the huge social distances entailed by deep inequality foster manifold patterns of authoritarian relations in various encounters between the privileged and the others. ' Ibid. redress will find their capacity 'to control public decision-making and to ensure policy outcomes' significantly reduced. Przeworski and colleagues, who assert that it appears that democracies are less stable in societies that are more unequal to begin with, in societies in which household income inequality increases, and in societies in which labor receives a lower share of value added in manufacturing. Ibid. According to de la Paz, the development of civil society is key to understanding this causal connection. As social inequality is generally associated with high levels of poverty and illiteracy, 'it has a negative impact on the development of civil society.' Civil society, however, appears to be necessary to provide the fundamental conditions for democracy. Ibid., 523. 'democratization of institutions precedes the democratization of society,' 118 where 'civil and political rights appear as prior to social economic and social rights,' 119 and where the transition to democracy 'is cast independent of changes in the organization of economic life.' 120 Conversely, the research available confirms the capability rights perspective advanced here, which holds that the political and the economic sphere are profoundly interconnected, an insight that cannot be neglected when rethinking transitional justice in terms of the recovery of victims' capability rights.
Towards a New Architecture of Transitional Justice
This article attempts to show that the whole spectrum of human rights via the capability rights perspective can and needs to be part of the transitional justice framework, enabling it to respond comprehensively to historical injustice. The underlying new conceptualization of the normative shift is crucial in that regard. How can law lay claim to change if it is excluding a priori one potential dimension of pretransitional injustice?
Evolving Normative Integrity
The conditio sine qua non of the normative shift is law's responsiveness, that is, its ability to respond to previous injustice. Transitional justice is contingent upon its response to all forms of injustice, including the repair of harm produced by previous regimes. Consequently, to the extent that law is able to respond to prior injustice it is able to perform the required normative shift from Unrechtsstaat to Rechsstaat, from the un-rule of illegitimate law to the rule of legitimate law. As domestic law was compromised in the past, the normative shift is rendered possible via external standards such as international human rights law. A normative shift is able to contribute genuinely to the legitimacy of the new dispensation provided socioeconomic rights form part of these external standards. The conceptualization of human rights as capability rights derived from the capability approach demonstrates the indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights, in particular of civil-political rights and socioeconomic rights.
Responding to Structural Exclusion
The reconceptualization of transitional justice proposed here takes up law's challenge in transition to embody a fundamental responsiveness to pretransitional injustice, particularly in terms of violations of socioeconomic rights. As Philippe Nonet and Philip Selznick assert, 'responsive law aims at enablement and facilitation.'
122 Enablement and facilitation cannot be thought of as independent of socioeconomic needs. Otherwise, law, that is, genuinely responsive law, will not be able to (re)construct and sustain a 'political community that is inclusive, not the property of a few.' 123 As the capability rights perspective involves both an 'agent-rooted' and a structural-institutional dimension, it is well suited to instantiate the fundamental structural changes needed to overcome the vicious cycle of injustice marked by powerlessness. Without this new framework, structural exclusion and its consequences persist and threaten the democratic viability of the new polity as the victims of violations of socioeconomic rights remain deprived of their capabilities, unable to participate as equal citizens in social life, in the labour market and in the public sphere. Ibid., 117-118. 124 As John Alexander points out, 'when the capability shortfalls and deprivation that people face are things that they themselves have not asked for, a just society should address them as a claim of justice.' Alexander, supra n 50 at 170. The proposition of this principle builds primarily on Olson, supra n 53. For the concept of agency generally and its significance in the context of the capability approach, see, Crocker, supra n 64. Alexander, supra n 50 at 58. 128 Olson, supra n 53 at 201. 129 Ibid. As Olson argues, 'only when agency is both equal and sufficient can we claim that participation will enable citizens to sustain the means of their own agency,' that is, 'the means to prevent their own marginalization.' Ibid., 141. 
Principles of Transformative Justice
Enabling Transformative Justice
Law's pathology and its corrosive legacy, if not addressed, put the required normative shift in peril. In fact, this article suggests that a twofold rehabilitation is necessary: the rehabilitation of law in tandem with the rehabilitation of victims' capabilities. Both together empower victims in order to prevent the recurrence of deprivation effectively (e.g., via truth commissions and public debate). However, the possibility of political participation also has its material preconditions. This perspective is reflected in the concept of capability rights, for instance, the right to the capabilities of being able to find work, of becoming educated and of being able to live a healthy life of normal length. These socioeconomic capabilities have been shown to embody critical participatory capabilities. The recovery of participatory capabilities stands ultimately for the rehabilitation of victims as persons in freedom. Provided transitional law offers a process allowing victims of historical injustice to achieve sufficient and equal agency, victims have the opportunity to regain their agency as rights bearers, their rights subjectivity. 132 At the same time, transitional responsiveness needs to be attentive to the urgency of these claims of justice due to the corrosiveness of disadvantage and structural deprivation. These enduring harms demand structural change based on an investigation of historical, political and economic constraints on capabilities and the resulting capability deprivation. Without such transformation, new laws will 'largely codify these opposing principles and rules.' Ibid., 48. Accordingly, and especially in a context of transitional justice, the principles enumerated may have to compete, for example, with principles of international criminal law. considered. 137 All these fora would need to provide institutional space to enable civil society, and victims in particular, to participate.
Not only for the diagnosis itself but also for the corresponding transformative measures and the related monitoring procedures, the appropriate measurement will be critical when participatory fora assess violations of socioeconomic capabilities. The capability approach itself has been tested and served as a diagnostic tool. 138 The development of human rights measurement at UN level should prove useful in this regard, because of what may be called 'the emergence of convergence' between the capability approach to human rights and the method of human rights measurement promoted by the UN.
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The Challenge: Conditions of Inequality
Nonetheless, all these fora and procedures are contingent upon the conditions of socioeconomic inequality and the asymmetries of the inherited configuration of political power. These conditions need to be addressed, as they could hamper the exercise of public reasoning. As Henry Richardson asserts, the process of democratic debate and decision must itself be structured so as to allow each person a fair chance to participate and to counteract to a degree the political influence of disparities in economic and political power. Richardson, supra n 65 at 89. See also, Crocker, supra n 68, discussing enabling conditions. 
Conclusion
In sum, the more a transitional society invests in restoring and expanding participatory capabilities that constrained victims of past injustice, the more a society is able to respond ever more adequately to past injustice and overcome its consequences in the present.
Former victims will not only be able to participate in transitional justice mechanisms but also be empowered to function as equal citizens as transitional justice instantiates structural transformation, thereby building the foundations of a common future. Thus, to use a phrase advanced by Jürgen Habermas, the new architecture of transitional justice will be able to transform unjust structures and reconstitute 'social solidarity preserved in legal structures.'
